A month that has to be tabulated
Assumes Calendars, Phases and eclipses and Timescales.
The rung below fitted days into a year and found that the problem is a rational approximation: 365.2422 is not a whole number, and the whole history of the solar calendar is a sequence of fractions getting closer to its fractional part.
A lunisolar calendar has to do that twice at once. It has to keep its months in step with the Moon, so that the first of a month is a new moon, and its years in step with the Sun, so that a named month falls in the same season. And the two requirements are incompatible, because a year is 12.368266 synodic months and no whole number of months makes a whole number of years.
The two periods, and why they are what they are
The synodic month is 29.530589 days: the time from one new moon to the next, which is not the time the Moon takes to go round the Earth. The sidereal month is 27.32 days, and the difference is the same effect that makes a solar day longer than a sidereal one — the Sun has moved on, and the Moon has to catch up.
The tropical year is 365.2422 days: equinox to equinox, which is again not the orbital period, because the equinox itself moves.
Neither number is constant. Tidal friction is lengthening the month and the day; the year is shortening very slowly; and the changes are at the fifth decimal place over a millennium, which is large enough to matter for a rule quoted to four figures and small enough that no calendar has ever been designed around them.
Continued fractions, and why the historical cycles are exactly the convergents
The problem is to approximate 12.368266 by a fraction : years containing months. The tool for that is the continued fraction, and its convergents are best approximations in a strict sense — no fraction with a smaller denominator is closer.
Expanded, the ratio is
and the convergents are 12/1, 25/2, 37/3, 99/8, 136/11, 235/19, 4131/334.
Two of those have names. 99 months in 8 years is the octaeteris, used in archaic Greece; 235 months in 19 years is the Metonic cycle, attributed to Meton of Athens in 432 BC and independently in use in Babylon a century earlier.
They are not coincidences of history. They are what the arithmetic offers. Any society that keeps a lunisolar calendar for long enough discovers the octaeteris within a lifetime — the sort of near-commensurability that also makes eclipses repeat — the error is a day and a half per cycle, so it is unmistakable inside twenty years — and then discovers that nineteen years works spectacularly better.
Why nineteen is so much better than eleven
The jump in quality between 136/11 and 235/19 is a factor of thirty, and the reason is not about the Moon at all.
A convergent’s error is bounded by
where is the next partial quotient in the expansion. The quotient following 235/19 is 17 — much larger than the 1s and 2s around it — so the bound on 235/19’s error is seventeen times tighter than a generic convergent of that size would give.
A large partial quotient means the previous convergent was already very good, which is the same statement seen from the other side. It is why a Metonic cycle is out by two hours in nineteen years while its neighbour is out by a day and a half in eleven, and it is why the improvement after it is unusable: 4131 months in 334 years is accurate to a day in eleven thousand years, and requires a rule spanning three centuries.
Nineteen years is a human interval. Somebody can be told which year of the cycle it is and check it against a grandparent. Three hundred and thirty-four years is a document.
What a lunisolar calendar does with the cycle
Nineteen tropical years is 6939.60 days and 235 synodic months is 6939.69. So the rule is: nineteen years contain 235 months, which is twelve years of twelve months and seven years of thirteen.
Which seven is a matter of convention, and every lunisolar calendar has made a different choice. The Hebrew calendar intercalates in years 3, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 19 of its cycle, by a fixed rule with no observation in it. The Chinese calendar intercalates the month in which no principal solar term falls, which is an observational rule with the same nineteen-year average. The Babylonian scheme was fixed by decree in the fourth century BC after several hundred years of intercalating by inspection.
The moon that is not the Moon
Here is where the arithmetic turns into something stranger, and it is the point of this rung.
The date of Easter is defined as the first Sunday after the first full moon on or after the vernal equinox. All three of those terms were replaced by tables at the Council of Nicaea and afterwards, and the replacement is not an approximation to the sky — it is a substitution.
The equinox is fixed at 21 March by definition, regardless of where the actual equinox falls.
The full moon is the ecclesiastical full moon, the fourteenth day of a lunar month reckoned by a Metonic cycle through a quantity called the epact — the age of the moon on 1 January. It is computed from the year number by arithmetic, and it is never checked against the sky.
And the Sunday is the only part of the definition that is what it says.
The reason is not carelessness. A festival observed simultaneously across an empire cannot depend on whether a moon was visible from any particular place on any particular evening, and observation of a new crescent is notoriously dependent on weather, on horizon, and on how good the observer’s eyes are. A calendar’s job is agreement rather than accuracy, and once that is accepted the table is not a compromise but the correct design.
The mean moon and the true one
Every rule above uses a mean month, and the Moon does not keep one. A calendar has to decide whether to follow the mean or the actual sky, and the two traditions that made opposite choices are still in use.
The arithmetic tradition takes the mean. A month begins when the rule says it begins, computed from a cycle, and the date is known centuries in advance and is the same everywhere. Its failure mode is that the calculated new moon and the observed one can differ by up to about half a day, so the calendar’s first of the month occasionally falls on the wrong evening.
The astronomical tradition takes the true conjunction. The Chinese calendar defines a month to begin on the day containing the actual new moon, computed for a specific meridian, and its intercalary month is placed by a rule involving the Sun’s position rather than by a cycle. That removes the half-day error entirely and replaces it with two costs.
The first is that the calendar cannot be computed by a person with a table. It requires an ephemeris — a genuine calculation of two bodies’ positions, accurate to a fraction of a day, for every month. That is why the astronomical rule was historically a state function, maintained by an office, and why it changed whenever the official theory of the Moon’s motion was revised.
The second is that the answer depends on where the observer is. A conjunction happening at 23:50 local time in one place happens at 00:50 the next day a fifteen degrees to the east, so the month begins on different dates in different countries using nominally the same calendar. The Chinese rule fixes a meridian by convention, which resolves it by decree rather than by astronomy.
The choice is between a calendar that is wrong occasionally and everywhere alike, and one that is right always and differs by a day between cities, and each tradition has taken the trade it found more tolerable. The arithmetic tradition’s cost is an error; the astronomical tradition’s is a disagreement.
What the cycle is worth as an observation
It is worth asking how good the Metonic cycle is as a measurement, because it was one before it was a rule.
Nineteen years of observation, with the day of a new moon recorded to within a day, determines the ratio of the two periods to about one part in seven thousand. That is roughly what the discrepancy of two hours per cycle corresponds to, and it is the precision at which a Babylonian record-keeper working with a horizon, a tablet and no instrument at all was operating.
Running the cycle for several repetitions improves it. Four Metonic cycles is the Callippic cycle, 76 years, and its purpose was not a better calendar — it is the same fraction, — but a better number: Callippus dropped one day from the 27,759 that four Metonic cycles nominally contain, which is a correction to the assumed length of the year rather than to the ratio of the periods. Hipparchus later dropped one more day from four Callippic cycles, 304 years, and the length of the tropical year he inferred was wrong by about six minutes.
Six minutes in 365 days is one part in ninety thousand, from naked-eye observation, and it stood as the best available value for seventeen centuries.
What the drift has actually done
The Metonic cycle is out by 0.0868 days per nineteen years, in the direction that makes the calculated moon late. That is a day in 219 years.
The Julian computus — the one still used by the Eastern churches to date Easter — was fixed in the fourth century and has never been corrected. Sixteen hundred years at a day per 219 gives about seven days of accumulated lunar error, of which the reformed Gregorian computus removed most for the Western churches by introducing two corrections: a solar equation that skips a leap day in three century years out of four, and a lunar equation that advances the moon by a day eight times in 2500 years. Between them they hold the ecclesiastical moon within a couple of days of the real one indefinitely, which is as close as an arithmetic rule can get without becoming an ephemeris.
The two churches’ Easters therefore differ by up to five weeks, and the difference is almost entirely a thirteen-day offset in the assumed equinox plus a few days of accumulated lunar drift. It is a measurement of the arithmetic in the first figure of this essay, carried out over sixteen centuries by institutions that were not trying to measure anything.
The exceptions a rule accumulates
An arithmetic calendar is a rule, and a rule applied to a society acquires exceptions that have nothing to do with astronomy. The Hebrew calendar is the clearest case, and it is worth setting out because it shows what a lunisolar rule looks like once it has been used for long enough.
The base is the Metonic cycle with a fixed intercalation pattern, and a month length taken from a value for the synodic month accurate to a fraction of a second — a number transmitted from Babylonian astronomy and better than anything measured in Europe for another fifteen centuries. From that alone the calendar would be fully determined.
It is not, because four postponement rules sit on top. A new year may not begin on certain days of the week, because doing so would place a fast day adjacent to a sabbath in a way the law does not permit. A new year computed to fall after a particular hour of the day is pushed to the next. And two further rules exist solely to prevent the year lengths that the first two would otherwise produce, since a year is permitted only four possible lengths and the postponements would occasionally generate a fifth.
The last two are the interesting ones: they are corrections to corrections, introduced because a rule adopted for a religious reason had an arithmetic consequence nobody wanted. Their effect is that the calendar’s structure is periodic with a period of 689,472 years rather than nineteen, which is the smallest interval over which every combination of cycle position, weekday and postponement recurs.
None of that is astronomy. The underlying month is excellent and the year is inherited from the Metonic ratio, so the calendar drifts against the seasons at the rate the first figure gives — about a day in two centuries, which over the sixteen centuries since the rules were fixed has moved the spring festival measurably later. The astronomical error is a slow linear drift and the complexity is entirely social, which is a fair description of most calendars that have lasted.
There is a general point in the shape of it. A rule with a fixed period is easy to state and easy to check, and every constraint added on top of it multiplies the period of the whole system rather than adding to it. Four postponements with periods of seven days, of a fraction of a day, and of a year between them turn a nineteen-year cycle into one repeating on a scale nobody will ever observe — and the calendar remains perfectly usable, because what a user needs is next year’s dates rather than the length of the grand cycle.
That is worth holding against the astronomical tradition’s difficulty. An arithmetic calendar’s complexity is bounded and computable and its error is a slow drift; an observational one has no drift and no bound on the disagreement between two places using it. Neither has solved the problem the first figure states, which is that two periods with no common multiple cannot both be tracked exactly by any rule whatever.
What the arithmetic cannot fix
Three things.
The periods are not constant. The synodic month is lengthening by about 0.04 seconds per century, and the tropical year is shortening by about 0.5 seconds. Over the eleven thousand years that 4131/334 would nominally be good for, those drifts are larger than the cycle’s own error, so the better convergent is not actually better on its own timescale. There is a horizon past which arithmetic precision is pointless, and it is around two thousand years.
The Moon does not keep a mean month. The interval between successive new moons varies by up to thirteen hours either side of the mean, because the Moon’s orbit is eccentric and the Sun perturbs it. A calendar built on the mean month will therefore predict a new moon that has already happened, or has not yet, by half a day fairly regularly — irrespective of how good the mean is. And visibility is not the same as conjunction. A calendar that begins its month at the first sighting of the crescent — which several still do — is tracking a quantity that depends on the observer’s latitude, the season, the Moon’s ecliptic latitude and the clarity of the air, and which can differ by a day between two cities on the same evening. That is not an error in the arithmetic. It is a different definition, and no amount of arithmetic reconciles two definitions.
One more range of denominators shows how far the continued fraction has to run before it improves on the cycles anybody uses.
The lunar month resists every rule anybody has proposed for it, and that is the reason a lunisolar calendar is tabulated rather than computed — the arithmetic that would generate it does not close.
Where this ladder goes next
This rung has taken the reconciliation of two incommensurable periods and shown that the historical answers are exactly the convergents of one continued fraction, with the quality of each set by a single integer further along the expansion.
The rung above is the machinery that turned those cycles into an algorithm: the computus proper, the epact, the golden number and the dominical letter, which together compute a date from a year with no astronomy in the arithmetic at all — and which are a worked example of what happens when a periodic natural phenomenon is replaced by a finite-state calculation.
Beside it lies the eclipse cycles, which are the same continued-fraction problem with three periods instead of two, and where the near-coincidence that matters is a triple one.
And below it, the habit: an approximation’s quality is set by the term after the one being used. The Metonic cycle is not good because nineteen is a special number; it is good because the number after it in the expansion is seventeen, and that fact is invisible in the cycle itself and visible immediately in the fraction it came from.
What links here
Essays that link to this one from their own argument.
The objects this essay names
Each one links to every other essay that touches it.
ComputusContinued fractionConvergentEcclesiastical moonEpactIntercalationLunisolar calendarMetonic cycleOctaeterisPartial quotientSynodic monthTropical year