An error that is nearly all in one direction
Assumes Orbit determination, Harmonic law and Orbital elements.
The rung below this one found a determined problem with several answers: three perfect angles-only observations of a near-Earth asteroid, reduced by Gauss’s method, terminating in an equation of the eighth degree that can admit three admissible orbits at once.
That is the pathological case. The ordinary case is worse in a quieter way. The solution is unique, the fit is good, the residuals are small — and the uncertainty around that unique answer has a shape so lopsided that treating it as a blob throws away almost everything it says.
Where the asymmetry comes from
Take an orbit fit that has produced a semi-major axis good to some small and everything else in proportion. The mean motion follows from the semi-major axis and from nothing else:
An error in the size of the orbit is therefore an error in the rate at which the body goes round it. That is the whole of it. After time the two candidate orbits have accumulated a mean-anomaly difference , and the physical separation along the track is , which after revolutions is
Meanwhile the radial separation is still . The ratio is and it is exact. Nothing in that derivation is specific to asteroids. The same thing happens to a satellite, to a comet, to a spacecraft between planets. It is why a satellite catalogue’s predictions degrade in time of pass long before they degrade in altitude of pass, and why an amateur who points a telescope at a predicted position and finds nothing should try again ten minutes later before concluding anything.
What the fit actually delivers
An orbit determination returns six numbers and a covariance matrix. The matrix is where the information is, and the six numbers are the least interesting part of the output.
Its eigenvectors are directions in the space of orbits, and its eigenvalues are how well each is constrained. For a short observed arc the picture is stark: one eigenvalue is enormous and the rest are small. The direction with the enormous eigenvalue is very nearly “make the orbit slightly bigger and put the body slightly further back along it” — the combination the observations cannot separate, because a short arc of sky motion is compatible with a whole family of orbits differing in exactly that way.
The practical form of that family is a set of clone orbits — a few hundred or a few thousand solutions, each drawn from the covariance and each fitting the observations about as well as the nominal one. They are then integrated forward individually, which is the only honest way to propagate an uncertainty through a nonlinear system.
What comes back is not a cloud. It is a thread.
The line of variations
The dominant eigenvector, propagated forward, traces out a curve in space that the clones lie along. It is called the line of variations, and the name is exact: the clones vary along one line and hardly at all across it.
That changes the arithmetic of every question one might want to ask.
Two consequences follow, and both are counterintuitive enough to have caused public confusion more than once.
Impact probabilities move in jumps. A new observation shortens the line. If the capture circle is still on the shortened line, the probability rises, because the same total probability is now spread over less line. If the circle falls off the end, the probability drops to zero at a stroke. That is why a well-observed asteroid’s impact probability characteristically climbs for a few days and then vanishes — and why the climb is not evidence of anything getting worse.
The observation worth taking is not the one that fits best. A measurement that reduces the uncertainty across the track buys almost nothing, because there was almost none there. A measurement that shortens the line — a recovery at a widely different epoch, a precovery on an old plate, a radar range that fixes the distance directly — is worth orders of magnitude more. Ranking follow-up targets by how quickly the next observation would separate the candidates, rather than by how uncertain they currently are, is the standing recommendation and it falls straight out of this geometry.
The observation that is worth a hundred others
The asymmetry of the covariance has a mirror image in the asymmetry of the data, and it is the practical half of the subject.
Optical astrometry measures two angles and no distance. Over a short arc those angles constrain the direction well and the size of the orbit hardly at all, which is exactly the combination that leaves the line of variations long. Adding more optical observations from the same apparition shortens the line slowly, because they carry the same kind of information as the ones already in hand.
Three things carry a different kind.
A radar range measures the distance directly, at a precision of tens of metres, and the distance is the quantity the angles are worst at. A single radar detection of a newly discovered near-Earth asteroid routinely shrinks the along-track uncertainty by a factor of a hundred or more, and a radar Doppler measurement — the line-of-sight velocity, good to a millimetre a second — does the same for the rate.
A precovery is an image of the object taken before it was known to exist, found afterwards in an archive. Its precision is no better than any other optical position, and often worse; what it has is epoch. An observation twenty years old extends the arc by twenty years, and since the along-track error grows linearly with elapsed time, the leverage runs the other way too: a twenty-year baseline divides the mean-motion uncertainty by roughly the ratio of the baselines.
A second apparition does the same job without the archive. An object recovered at its next close approach has an arc spanning whole revolutions rather than a few weeks, and the difference in the covariance is not incremental — it is the difference between an orbit that is a family and an orbit that is a number.
The general statement behind all three is that the information a measurement carries is not its precision but its projection onto the direction that is poorly known. A very precise measurement of a well-determined quantity adds nothing; a mediocre measurement of the ill-determined one can be decisive. That is a property of least squares rather than of astronomy, and it is why observing programmes for near-Earth objects are scheduled by covariance rather than by magnitude.
What the observations are made of
The covariance is an output of a least-squares fit, and a fit is only as good as its statement of what the errors are. That statement has changed completely in the last decade, and the change is worth describing because it moved every orbit in the catalogue.
An optical astrometric observation is a position measured relative to catalogued stars in the same frame. Its error therefore has two parts: how well the object’s image was centred, and how well the reference stars’ positions were known. Until recently the second dominated. Catalogues in general use had systematic errors of a few tenths of an arcsecond, varying across the sky in patterns peculiar to each catalogue, so an observatory’s residuals carried a signature of which catalogue it had used rather than of how good its telescope was.
Those systematics do not average down. A thousand observations reduced against the same catalogue in the same region of sky share the same offset, and a least-squares fit that assumes independent errors treats the agreement among them as evidence and shrinks the covariance accordingly. The result is a formal uncertainty smaller than the true one — the failure mode that matters most here, because the whole apparatus of clones and lines of variations is a statement about the covariance being right.
The repair was twofold. Old observations are debiased, by applying a correction derived from comparing each historical catalogue against a modern one region by region. And new observations are reduced against a reference frame good to a fraction of a milliarcsecond, which removes the term entirely.
An orbit’s uncertainty is not measured, it is asserted — computed from a model of the observation errors — and improving that model changed thousands of published covariances without a single new observation being taken.
The same point applies to the weights the fit assigns. An observatory that reports a hundred positions from one night is not supplying a hundred independent constraints, and treating it as though it were is another route to a covariance that is too small.
When the arc is too short for a line
Everything above assumes there is an orbit to have a covariance about. Below a certain arc length there is not, and the object joins a population whose size is rarely appreciated: the ones that were seen, measured, and never found again.
A few nights of astrometry on a moving object give a direction and a rate of change of direction — four numbers — and an orbit needs six. The two that are missing are the distance and the rate of change of distance, and they are missing in the strong sense that the data are consistent with a continuous two-dimensional range of them.
So the object’s possible orbits do not form a line. They form a region, and the region is bounded only by physical arguments: the object must be bound to the Sun, it must not be inside the Earth, and it must be large enough to have been detectable at the distance being posited. That bounded region is what the follow-up is chasing, and it can be large enough that the object’s predicted position a month later spans tens of degrees.
The consequence is a linkage problem rather than a prediction problem. An object seen on two nights in one month and two nights in the next is two short arcs, and deciding whether they are the same object requires searching for an orbit consistent with both — against a catalogue of hundreds of thousands of other objects any of which might be the match. That search is the reason surveys are designed to revisit the same field on a cadence rather than to cover the most sky.
The line of variations is what a short arc becomes once it is long enough to have one, and the transition between the two-dimensional region and the one-dimensional line is where most of an object’s uncertainty is actually removed.
Keyholes
Inside the line of variations there are intervals that miss the Earth now and return to strike later.
The mechanism is a resonance. A body that passes at a particular distance is deflected onto an orbit whose period is a simple ratio of the Earth’s, which brings it back to the same point in space at the same time of year some whole number of years later. The interval of the target plane that produces such an orbit is narrow — kilometres, sometimes hundreds of metres — and it is called a keyhole.
A keyhole is a small target, which is why the probability attached to one is usually tiny. It is also the reason a deflection mission would be planned decades in advance and would need to move an asteroid by only a few hundred metres: the object is not being pushed away from the Earth, it is being pushed off a keyhole.
The best-known case is Apophis, which was found in 2004 and briefly carried an impact probability of about one in thirty-seven for 2029 — the highest ever assigned to a sizeable object. A precovery image from March 2004, located after the fact, extended the arc backwards and removed the 2029 possibility entirely within days. What remained for the next fifteen years was a set of keyholes for 2036 and 2068, each a few hundred metres wide in the 2029 target plane, and radar observations in 2021 closed all of them.
None of that sequence is a story about the object changing. It is a story about a line getting shorter.
Why the growth eventually stops being linear
The law is a linearisation, and it holds while the clones stay close enough together that the same linear map applies to all of them. Two things end it.
The first is a close approach. Passing a planet at a distance that differs by a few thousand kilometres from clone to clone produces post-encounter orbits that differ by far more than the pre-encounter ones did — the encounter multiplies the spread, sometimes by two or three orders of magnitude. After that, the line of variations may fold or break into disconnected pieces.
The second is chaos in the ordinary sense. For a body whose orbit crosses several planets, the Lyapunov time can be a few decades, and past a few Lyapunov times the notion of “the orbit” has stopped meaning anything.
What is being reported
The number quoted for an asteroid — “one chance in sixteen thousand in 2046” — is therefore the output of a specific and rather elaborate calculation: a fit, a covariance, a few thousand clones, a numerical integration of each of them through every planetary perturbation, and a weighted count of how many land inside a circle whose radius is set by gravitational focusing.
It is not a statement about the asteroid. It is a statement about what the current observations fail to exclude, and it changes when they change. The Palermo and Torino scales exist to convey that, and they are routinely reported as though they were properties of the object.
There is one further wrinkle, and it is the reason the numbers are not purely a matter of geometry. Small asteroids are pushed by sunlight. Thermal re-emission from a rotating body is not symmetric — the afternoon side is warmer than the morning side — and the resulting recoil produces a tiny along-track acceleration that changes the semi-major axis by metres per year. Over decades that is a displacement of thousands of kilometres, comparable with the width of the target the calculation is aiming at. So the fit has to carry that acceleration as yet another parameter, determined from the astrometry itself; and since it depends on the body’s size, shape, spin and thermal inertia, none of which is usually known, it is often the largest single term in the error budget for a prediction fifty years out. The same class of small non-gravitational force is why a spacecraft’s trajectory has to be tracked rather than computed, and here it is being measured on a body nobody can visit. One more covariance calculation shows what a worse astrometric error does to the same ellipse.
Where this ladder goes next
This rung has established the shape of the uncertainty and what follows from it: a line rather than a ball, a probability that is an integral along it, and an observing strategy that follows from the geometry rather than from intuition.
The rung above is the deflection problem proper, where the question stops being what the covariance is and becomes what a given impulse does to it — and where the answer turns out to depend on the keyhole structure far more than on the size of the impulse.
Beside it lies the survey-design question. Given a telescope and a fixed amount of time, the optimal observing programme is not the one that observes each object best; it is the one that shortens the most lines of variation per hour, and that is a different allocation entirely.
And below it, as the habit: an uncertainty has a shape, and the shape is usually more informative than the size. A single number quoted for the accuracy of a position has thrown away the one thing a covariance was computed to say.
What links here
Essays that link to this one from their own argument.
- An orbit moved by heat orbits
- A surface dated by counting holes in it orbits
- Aiming at a plane instead of at a planet orbits
- An eccentricity that cannot be zero orbits
- A collision rate that needs no collision spaceflight
- A forecast that fails on a schedule exoplanets
- A position measured from a frequency spaceflight
- One number where two masses were gravitation
The objects this essay names
Each one links to every other essay that touches it.
Along-track errorArc lengthClone orbitsCondition numberCovarianceGravitational focusingImpact probabilityKeyholeThe line of variationsObservabilityResonant returnTarget plane